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Abstract 
Non-profit organisations (NPOs) play a critical role in society’s political and socio-economic development as more 
cost-effective, flexible and less bureaucratic surrogates for governments. This paper focuses on the management 
of strategic change in this rarely researched sector. The study critically reviewed the management of strategic 
change in a regional inter-governmental organisation and a regional non-governmental organisation. It investigated 
how change was previously managed and assessed the impact of the respective change management initiatives on 
the strategic direction of the organisations. The study also carried out a comparative analysis of change 
management strategies in the two organisations highlighting what worked well in one organisation that might not 
have worked well in the other and vice versa. Finally, it considered how change can best be managed in future in 
these and other similar organisations. The study utilised a case study approach and adopted an inductive stance 
resulting in general conclusions and recommendations being drawn on future change management in the 
organisations based on the researcher’s empirical observations taking a ‘phenomenological’ approach. The study 
revealed some striking similarities just as there were acute disparities in the manner strategic change was managed 
in both organisations. The conclusion from this study is that the NPOs do not follow any specific model of change 
as espoused in the literature although some aspects of the models could be retroactively applied. This suggests that 
non-profits have a lesser motivation to adopt and implement change instantly and apply the change models that 
would be efficiently and effectively applied to commercial enterprises which may be due to the lack of profit 
motive in this sector. The overall implication is that there is great potential for NPOs to ‘borrow’ and customize 
some proven strategic change management practices which have resulted in improved performance and attainment 
of desired results in the private sector and in some NPOs internationally as attested to by this study.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background to Non-Profit Organisations 
The genesis of non-profit organisations (NPOs), also known as not-for-profit, non-governmental or third sector 
orgnisations is traceable to the mid-19th century when the significant non-profit, the World’s Young Christian 
Men’s Association (YCMA), was formed in 1844 in pursuit of social objectives (Glaeser & Shleifer, 2001; Muravu, 
2020). According to Glaeser & Shleifer (2001), Jean-Henri Dunant after co-founding the YCMA, later founded 
the Red Cross in 1864 after witnessing the bloody battle of Solferino. John Muir founded the non-profit Sierra 
Club in 1892. Since then, NPOs have continued to play a critical role in society’s political and socio-economic 
development. The development NPO is thus an enterprise that has emerged fundamentally pursuant to social 
objectives through implementation of social programmes which result in positive social change. Their investment 
open life-long opportunities to target beneficiaries, hitherto disadvantaged, individuals, families and communities 
and this is their true ‘shareholders’ return on investment. The non-profit organisation model differs from 
conventional business in that ‘investors’ in the former don’t want a return and the ‘customers’ usually pay nothing 
(Kareithi & Lund, 2012; Muravu, 2011). Ordinarily, NPOs do not earn a profit but can achieve a surplus which 
they utilise for self-preservation and furtherance of their objectives (Anheier, 2000; Glaeser & Shleifer, 2001; 
Kareithi & Lund, 2012).  
1.1.1 Definition of Non-Profit Organisations 
In definitional terms, NPOs are “a diverse set of institutions that operate on non-profit basis, generally serve the 
public sector, and are engaged in long-term development work within the framework of international development 
cooperation” (Kareithi & Lund, 2012, p1; Fowler, 1997). Like all organisations, they differ in size, mission, 
operational mode and impact (Anheier, 2000), ranging from “grassroots or community level to national, regional 
or international level” (Kareithi & Lund, 2012, p.1; Fowler, 1997) thus “the diversity of NGO typology is a 
complex, contested and controversial matter” (Kareithi & Lund, 2012, p.1). Anheier (2000) reckons their models 
range from approximating a government agency; resembling a business firm while others are slightly more than a 
mere informal network. Fowler (1996) asserts that NPOs are unlike both private sector companies and government 
in that they lack the traditional ‘bottom line’ nor are they recipients of citizenry ‘judgement' via civil strife or the 
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periodic electoral vote. Despite these apparent differences there is a convergence of thought among researchers as 
to what are the core characteristics of NPOs (Anheier, 2000; Salamon & Anheier, 1997):  
Organisation: They are constituted as a formal institution differentiating them from informal entities; 
Private: They are autonomous from government hence they not public sector institutions; 
Non-profit-distributing: Generated surpluses are not returned to owners making them clearly distinct from 
businesses; 
Self-governing: They control their activities which clearly distinguishes them from affiliates of other companies; 
and 
Voluntary: Their activities and / or management are non-compulsory albeit they may have some voluntary 
component. 
1.1.2 The Role of Non-Profit Organisations 
There is reasonable amount of literature on the role of NPOs in the United States and Europe (e.g. Anheier, 2000; 
Billis, 1989; Handy, 1988; Hudson, 1999) and globally. Ebrahim (2003) asserts that the rapid growth of NGOs all 
over the world in the last three decades of the 20th century was oiled by the belief among donors that NPOs are 
more cost effective than governments in delivering key social services, have a better reach to societal poor and 
underprivileged, and have played a key role in democratization processes the world over. They have transformed 
into a crucial sector of the globalised economy and play a self-evidently fundamental role in assisting governments 
with execution of social programmes with positive impact in many countries (Anheier, 2000; Brickley & Van 
Horn, 2000; Muravu, 2020). Research in the NPO sector revealed that NPOs increased threefold from circa 
300,000 to over 1,000,000, in the United States alone between 1970 and 2000. In the 1990s their revenues 
constituted over 10% of Gross National Product (GNP) thereby constituting a critical sector of the economy 
(Brickley & Horn, 2000). NonProfit PRO, a US think tank on non-profit strategy and management estimates the 
number of US NPOs at between 1.5 and 1.8 million in 2018 (Te, 2018; Te, 2018a). This means that NPOs have 
more between quintupled and sextupled in the last half century and the numbers keep rising each day. 
1.1.3 Criticisms of Non-Profit Organisations 
NPOs have been roundly criticized (e.g. Ebrahim, 2003; Edwards & Hulme,1996; Mackintosh, 1992; Reddel, 
1999;) including claims that there is lack of empirical evidence to support their achievements. They are further 
accused of overvaluing their societal necessity claiming it is based on perceived usefulness than demonstrable 
assessment of their practical achievements. The increased role of development NPOs in international development 
and attendant exponential upsurge in their number in the last decade of the 20th century unavoidably led to massive 
apprehension and focus on their performance from development practitioners, society, governments, development 
partners, policymakers and academia (Edwards & Hulme, 1995; Edwards & Fowler, 2002; Kareithi & Lund, 2012; 
Kareithi & Flisher, 2009; Unerman & O'Dwyer, 2006). Consequently, NPO research later reflected an increasing 
tendency of substantial attempts to demonstrate performance (Lewis, 2006; Kareithi & Lund, 2012) due to sterner 
official donor covenants and amplified desire by NPOs to demonstrate their achievements for “accountability, self-
motivation and improvement” (Kareithi & Lund, 2012,p.1; Fowler, 1996; Patton, 2003). Further, difficulties have 
been identified pertaining to the assessment of operational performance of development NPOs (Fowler, 1996) but 
these are beyond the purview of this study. Notwithstanding these criticisms, NPOs play an actively ‘”important 
role in health care, education, social services, and the arts’ and are ‘a prominent feature in many other countries” 
(Salamon and Anheier, 1996; Brickley & Horn, 2000, p.2). 
 
1.2 Purpose of the Study 
Given the demonstrable positive societal value of the non-profit sector, there is surprisingly little empirical work 
on strategic change management in NPOs among the general dearth of management literature in the sector (Muravu, 
2020; Kareith & Lund, 2012). Despite NPOs having existed for nearly two centuries not much is documented on 
the sector until its rapid progression in the 1970s (Kareithi & Lund, 2012). Kareith and Lund’s (2012) study on 
NPO research revealed i) few published NPO researchers in Africa ii) the continuous necessity for amplified NPO 
research. Additionally, there has been a call from scholars for additional and more systematic research in the NPO 
sector coming with the caveat that NGO research trends have been “based on ideological grounds in the absence 
of empirical verification” (Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Kareithi & Lund, 2012, p.1). The literature also claimed that 
insufficient NPO research imply this subject area will remain perpetually embryonic, negatively impacting access 
to accurate and comprehensive information which would impair funding decisions (Unerman & O'Dwyer, 2006; 
Fowler, 1997; Edwards & Hulme, 1995) the sector desperately needs and is hugely reliant on. This paper attempts 
to address the identified dearth of published strategic management literature and contribute too theory of 
international non-profit development organisations which is one of the most important sectors of the modern 
globalised political economy.  
 
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
Drawing from the purpose of the study, the overall aim of the research is to develop recommendations for future 
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management of strategic change in the subject non-profit organisations and other similar organisations. The 
study will critically review the management of strategic change in international development NPOs with specific 
reference to a an international non-governmental and a regional inter-governmental organisation. The specific 
objectives of the research are: 
 To critically evaluate the literature on strategic change management particularly as it relates to NPOs. 
 To measure how strategic change has been implemented using an inter-governmental and an international 
organisation as a primary point of reference. 
 Based on the literature review and the research, provide recommendations for future change management 
for the organisations. 
It will investigate how change has been managed in the past and the impact on the strategic direction of the 
organisations. Finally, it will recommend how change can best be managed in future in these organisations. 
Additionally, the study is of specific interest to the author, who has been involved in NPO general management 
for two decades. The paper will attempt to address the following questions:                                                                                                                                                  
 How has strategic change been managed in non-profit organisations in the past? 
 What has been the impact of change management on the organisations’ strategic direction?  
 What worked well in one organisation that didn’t quite work well in the other and vice versa? 
 How can strategic change in NPOs be managed more effectively in future? 
This paper is structured as follows: 
 Section 1 provides the study’s background and sets the context, aim and objectives of the study.    
 Section 2 constitutes a critical review and comparative analysis of the different organisational change 
models, approaches to implementing strategic change and their applicability to the non-profit sector.  
 Section 3 details the method and articulates the rationale for the adopted research approach.  
 Section 4 is the presentation and analysis of the research data and major findings of the study. 
 Section 5 presents the study’s findings and concludes by drawing implications and recommendations 
therefrom. 
 
2. Literature Review 
This section reviews the existing models and frameworks on the management of organisational strategic change 
and various approaches to implementing change and covers the following: 
 Definition of strategic change; 
 The purpose of organisational change; 
 Change management theories;  
 Change management in government; 
 Change management in the non-profit sector; and  
 Identifying existing gaps in current literature to be explored by this research. 
 
2.1 Change Management 
2.1.1 Definition of strategic change 
There are many definitions of strategic change just as there is a myriad of authors on the subject. Moran and 
Brightman (2001) defined change management as ‘the process of continually renewing an organisation’s direction, 
structure, and capabilities to save the ever-changing needs of internal and external customers’ (p.111). Senior and 
Flemming (2006) define organisational change as “winds which are many and varied - from small summer breezes 
that merely disturb a few papers to mighty howling gales which cause devastation” (Knight & Marshall, 2008 
p.55). The literature is clear that change can be rapid or moderate, significant or negligible, can take place over a 
long period of time or abruptly and it can occur at the strategic or operational levels. 
2.1.2 Purpose of Organisational Change 
There is abundant literature on organisational change and approaches to implementing change. Key change 
management writers are agreed that change is now ‘the stable state’ of modern organisations (French & Bell, 1995; 
Kotter, 1995; Gravenhost et al 2003). Organisations change in response to various factors like changes in the 
external environment, market changes or due to internal demands. It can therefore be argued that in an era of rapid 
change like the 21st century, no organization is immune to change hence change becomes a perpetual necessity. 
2.1.3 Change Management Theories  
As acknowledged already, a lot has been written about change management. Knight and Marshall (2008, p.55) 
admit that there is a ‘myriad excellent textbooks on Change’ confirming the abundance of quality literature on 
generic strategic change. Below we discuss some key theories on management of change. The theories are 
presented in chronological order covering over half a century and reflects how change management theory evolved 
rather than importance. 
 
4 
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2.1.3.1 Lewin’s ‘Forcefield Analysis’ Model of Change  
Lewin’s (1947) ‘forcefield analysis’ is one of the earliest change models which is a decent starting point for any 
change management inquiry pipeline. Lewin provides a unique way of appreciating planned change through 
“unfreezing, changing and refreezing” in his Force Field Analysis model (Schein 1996, p.71; Rahim & Panicker 
2000, p.3). The model highlights the importance of identifying what Lewin calls “driving and restraining forces 
of change”. Schein (1996) stated, “I found Lewin’s basic change model of unfreezing, changing and refreezing to 
be a theoretical foundation upon which change theory could be built solidly” (p.59). He openly admitted that he 
was amazed at ‘the depth of Lewin’s insight and the seminal nature of his concepts and methods” (p.71). He 
conceded that the limited aspects of Lewin’s theory on which he reflected in his (Schein’s) work ‘have deeply 
enriched our understanding of how change happens and what role change agents can and must play if they are to 
be successful’ (p.71). Lewin’s model is criticized for being highly ‘simplistic’ and ‘mechanistic’ on its assumptions 
regarding organisational stability because organisations are dynamic and can never be ‘frozen’. Some authors 
argue that the model is more suited for small scale incremental and isolated change. Further, it underplays 
organizational power and politics and its ‘top-down’ approach ignores ‘bottom‐up’ change. Despite the criticisms, 
the model has withstood the taste of time and continues to influence planned change in organisations nearly three 
quarters of a century after its proposition. 
2.1.3.2 Greiner’s ‘Growth Phase Model’ 
Also called Greiner’s Organisational Life Cycle, is a natural second model for consideration because it describes 
the various stages through which organizations grow and develop. Greiner (1972,) identified five (later six) phases 
in the growth of an organization. Each phase is followed by a ‘point of crisis’, a key change or decision point, 
which signals the start of the next phase. They are: 
Creativity phase: This is often the entrepreneurial stage which is capped by a ‘crisis of leadership’. 
Direction phase: Division of labour results is followed by a ‘crisis of autonomy’. 
Delegation phase: Characterized by formal system of control and ends with a ‘crisis of control’. 
Coordination phase: The organization has reached its peak and performance starts to decline hence there is need 
for strategic change. A ‘crisis of red tape’ ensues. 
Collaboration phase: New evolutionary path, matrix organization, simplified control mechanisms ending by a 
‘crisis of uncertainty/internal growth’. 
Greiner (1998) added a sixth phase, Extra-organisational solutions phase, which is characterized by strategic 
alliances, mergers, holdings, organisational networks. Organisations need appropriate strategies and structures to 
cope with each growth phase. Greiner’s framework explains why certain management styles, organisational 
structures and coordination mechanisms work in certain phases yet may not work in others. The model also 
highlights that at the crisis point, some painful and far reaching decisions will have to be made. The major 
weakness of Greiner’s model is that it does not provide solutions for transitioning change from one stage to the 
next. This model can be applied together with models and techniques for diagnosing the prevailing change situation 
to help prescribe the most suitable change approach.  
2.1.3.3 Tushman et. al’s ‘Frame-Breaking Change’  
Tushman, Newman and Romanelli (1988) developed a framework of change implementation like Grundy’s in 
certain respects. Based on numerous organisational studies and case history, they proposed an organisational life 
model consisting of ‘periods of incremental change, or convergence, punctuated by discontinuous changes.’ They 
put forward two types of converging change: ‘fine-tuning’ and ‘incremental adaptations’. The former is aimed at 
improving what is already done well with the latter involving minor changes to align to small shifts in the 
organisation’s environment. Tushman et al note that these two types of change are suitable for minimal change 
but where major changes in strategy, structure, people and processes is required the organisation will have to 
undergo ‘discontinuous’ or ‘frame-breaking’ change. The major strength of Tushman’s model is that it is based 
on wide research and investigation. 
2.1.3.4 Grundy’s ‘Major Types of Change’ 
Grundy (1993) maintained that it is important for managers to identify the type of change they intend to implement 
as it determines how to approach the change. Grundy identified three ‘varieties of change’ which are reflected in 
Figure 1 below. ‘Smooth incremental change’ is change that emerges ‘slowly in a systematic and predictable way’. 
‘Bumpy incremental change’ is characterised by periods of relative quiet followed by an accelerated pace of 
change. ‘Discontinuous change’ is marked by rapid change ‘in strategy, structure or culture or in all three’. 
Grundy’s ‘three types of change’ model is criticised for being overly simplistic. Grundy confirms that the model 
had not yet been empirically tested and this supported the contention that it is based on ‘observation’ rather than 
‘investigation and research’.  
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Figure 1: Grundy’s Major Types of Change 
Source: Grundy (1993) 
2.1.3.5 Kotter’s ‘Eight Stages of Change’ 
Kotter's (1995) popular Eight-Step Change model for planning, implementing and sustaining change is an 
important tool in any leader’s toolbox of change. The steps are: 
i) Establish a sense of urgency 
ii) Form a powerful coalition 
iii) Create a vision 
iv) Communicate the vision 
v) Empower others to act on the vision 
vi) Plan for and create short term wins 
vii) Capitalise on early wins to motivate others to pursue further change 
viii) Institutionalise new approaches 
Kotter notes that failure to address any one of the steps is a significant error which can negatively affect the 
change process outcome and that making fewer errors can spell the difference between success and failure.  
2.1.3.6 Strebel’s ‘Break Points’ 
Linked to an orgnisation’s competitive environment, Strebel (1996) introduced the concept of ‘breakpoints’ as a 
way of identifying when organizations must change their strategies in response to changes in competitor behavior. 
This ‘evolutionary cycle of competitive behaviour’ begins with the innovation phase when a new business 
opportunity is discovered. This results in ‘divergence’ competitors’ behavior to exploit the new opportunity. The 
second phase ‘convergence’ follows due to saturation as competitors converge on quality and re-engineering 
strategies. Beyond this a new business opportunity is identified to bring a new break point and the cycle re-starts. 
Strebel’s model is useful in exploring the organisation’s external environment particularly the economic and 
technological aspects. Strebel further provides useful hints on how to decipher patterns in the environment that 
indicate the imminence of a breakpoint. 
2.1.3.7 Balogun and Hope Hopley’s ‘Change Kaleidoscope’ 
Balogun and Hope Hailey (2004) introduced the change kaleidoscope which sets: 
i) The overall organisational change context to be considered to avoid quick fixes to change problems. 
ii) Eight contextual features (time, scope, preservation, diversity, capability, capacity, readiness and power).  
iii) Six design choices (change path, change start-point, change style, change target, change roles and change levers) 
as reflected in the change kaleidoscope (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2: The Change Kaleidoscope 
Source: Balogun & Hope Hailey (2004) 
The change kaleidoscope exposes the unenviably numerous implementation decisions that a change agent is 
faced with and must make in context of the organisation. 
2.1.3.8 Mintzberg’s ‘Change Cube’ 
Mintzberg et al (2003) present organizational change process by plotting it in terms of a series of dichotomies 
from ‘formal to informal’, ‘conceptual to concrete’, ‘micro to macro’, ‘evolved to planned’ and ‘top-down’ to 
‘bottom-up’. An organisation can change its direction (strategy) or its present state (structure). Coined the ‘Change 
Cube Model’, the authors’ purpose was to enable readers to gain insight into how change affects the configuration 
of the various organisational elements. Since a change in one element of strategy or structure results in change in 
other more concrete elements, these inter-dependencies are better managed when ‘cause-effect’ relations are well-
comprehended. 
2.1.3.9 Types of Strategic Change 
Balogun and Hope Hailey (2005) and Johnson and Scholes (2005) identified the following four types of strategic 
change (see Figure 3). 
Adaptation: Refers to incremental change which doesn’t require shift in the present paradigm. 
Reconstruction: Is change which may be rapid and could result in upheaval in the organisation but does not demand 
fundamental change to the existing paradigm. 
Evolution: Is a change in strategy which requires a paradigm change but over time. 
Revolution: Refers to change which requires rapid and major strategic and paradigm change.   
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Figure 3: Types of Change 
Source: Balogun & Hope Hailey (2004) 
The figure identifies four types of strategic change plotted against the nature of change and the end state.  
2.1.3.10 The ‘Cultural Web’ 
Culture is ‘how things are done around here’ (Drennan, 1992). Johnson (1990), Johnson and Scholes (1999), 
Johnson et al (2005) and Knight & Marshall (2008, p.270), devised the cultural behavior model as a technique for 
managing change. They tried to explain why firms often fail to adjust to environmental change as quickly as 
required. The model is concerned with the manifestations of culture in organisations and identifies six interrelated 
elements, namely: 
Symbols / titles: Symbolic aspects of the organization,  
Power structures: Core assumptions and important beliefs 
Organisational structures: Formal or informal systems 
Control systems: Measurements and reward systems 
Rituals / routines: Interactive behaviour and rituals 
Myths / stories: Embed organizational history into the present 
Johnson (1990) concluded that firms developed a way of comprehending their organisation – a paradigm or shared 
mindset – out of which they could not think if it were particularly strong. Together with Lewin’s forcefield analysis, 
the ‘cultural web’ is a useful means of identifying obstructions to and potential accelerators for change. 
2.1.4 Styles for Managing Change 
Styles of change management describe how the change process is actually managed. They are not new at all but 
to some extent reworking and expansion of the ‘design choices’ in the Balogun and Hope Hailey’s change model. 
They sit on a continuum ranging from “coercion” in which change is forced on people, through ‘collaboration’ 
and ‘participation’ in which employees are involved on what and how to change, to ‘education’ and ‘delegation’ 
in which change is mostly delegated. 
2.1.5 Resistance to Change 
Even with the best planned change process, some reaction to change is inevitable. Negative reactions are bound to 
be experienced in overt behaviour or passive resistance. There are four basic reactions to change and these can be 
countered in various ways. 
Disengagement: Refers to psychological withdrawal from change which is countered by involving the affected 
individual to freely identify and address their concerns.  
Disidentification: The individual’s identity feels threatened by the change and they must be involved to establish 
change ownership and commitment. 
Disenchantment:  Is usually expressed as negativity, anger or coalition building. The anger must be managed, 
acknowledged as normal and not held against them.  
Disorientation: The employee become lost and confused and change must be explained to minimise the ambiguity 
that they experience.  
Managers must be able to diagnose these reactions especially because each brings with it significant and different 
concerns such that there is no ‘one best way’ to address them. The traditional view of managing resistance to 
change is to treat it as something to be overcome but the contemporary view holds resistance simply as some form 
of feedback which can be used very productively to manage the change process. The key strategies for managing 
resistance to change are communication, participation, empathy and support.  
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2.1.6 Synthesis of Change Management Theories and Concepts 
The literature review has revealed that change can be ‘strategic’ or ‘operational’, ‘transformational or incremental’, 
‘planned or emergent’, ‘evolutionary or revolutionary’, ‘continuous or discontinuous’, ‘re-engineering or learning’. 
A lot of organisations have made a huge investment in knowledge and learning, yet Gravenhurst et al, (2003) argue 
that organisations never seem to get it right given that the outcome of change is, in most cases, not what was 
planned. It would therefore appear that no one has ‘cracked the code’ of change just yet and the reality is that 70% 
of all change initiatives result in failure (Balogun & Hope Hailey, 2004; Beer & Nohria, 2000). Gravenhurst et al 
(2003) further argue that this is because the pace of change is so fast that old projects are dumped before anticipated 
results are realised and new ones taken on board abruptly. In some cases, change leaders and agents fail to realize 
the need for urgency of the change, the speed of change is either hurried or slowed, change objectives are not 
properly aligned or are too general and leaders have either too much or too little authority to be effective (Beer et 
al 1990; Kotter 1996; Pfeffer 1992; Gravenhurst et al 2003). If change is to be successful, there is a need to study 
what hinders or facilitates far-reaching change in the “characteristics of organisations, and in the design and 
management of change processes” (Gravenhorst et al, 2003, p.84). Figure 4 below, Barbara Senior’s Nature of 
Change, is a summary of the similarities and congruences between the change theories and research positions 
discussed in this paper. It highlights the need to consider the environmental forces of change followed by the type 
of change. It represents the view of significant authors on change literature but there is need to evaluate the 
potential value of each of these models, concepts and ideas.  
Environmental Forces for Change Types of Change 
Ansoff & 
McDonnell 
(1990) 
Strebel 
(1996) 
Stacey 
(1996) 
Tushman et 
al. (1988) 
Dunphy and 
Stace (1993) 
Balogun & 
Hope Hailey 
(2004) 
Grundy 
(1993) 
Stacey 
(1996a) 
Predictable Weak Close to 
certainty 
Converging 
(fine-tuning) 
Fine-tuning Adaptation Smooth 
incremental 
Closed 
Forecastable 
by 
extrapolation 
Moderate Close to 
certainty 
Converging 
(incremental) 
Incremental 
adjustment 
Evolution  - Contained 
Predictable 
threats & 
opportunities 
- - - Modular 
transformation 
Reconstruction Bumpy 
incremental 
- 
Partially 
predictable 
opportunities 
Strong - - Corporate 
transformation 
Revolution - - 
Unpredictable 
surprises 
- Far 
from 
certainty 
Discontinuous 
or frame 
breaking 
 - -  Discontinuous Open 
ended 
Figure 4: Environmental conditions and types of change 
Source: Senior and Fleming (2006) 
The above comparative table evaluates the various models, theories, concepts and research positions of 
authors discussed in this paper, by considering environmental forces of change and the type of change.  
 
2.2 Change Management in Government 
Some change authors have attempted to apply existing models of change to government with differing levels of 
success. This section considers two such attempts by Ostroff (2006) and Panicker & Rahim (2007), how they fared, 
what gaps they identified and whether there are any proposed developments to plug hitherto existing gaps in 
attempting to apply conventional change models to public agencies. 
2.2.1 Ostroff’s Change Management in Government 
In his 2006 Harvard Business Review article, Ostroff asserts that high performing government agencies resemble 
well-run companies in respects such as having “worthy goals; well designed, rational processes; strict 
accountability; and effective leaders” (p.1). Yet fundamental differences their purposes, cultures, and the 
operational context conjure mean they experience intrinsically different challenges.  
Ostroff (2006) identified four obstacles unique to bringing about successful change and significant, sustained 
performance improvement in the public sphere. These were:  
i) Agency leaders are appointed based on policy command and cronyism, and not meritocracy. 
ii) Bureaucratic and time-consuming appointment of agency leaders leaves insufficient time for actual 
implementation of meaningful change.  
iii) Agency operational rules meant to safeguard public sector governance and accountability lead to inflexibility. 
iv) Multiplicity of agency stakeholders who can disapprove of the agency operations any moment. 
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Based on his vast experience as both a public and private sector consultant, Ostroff identified five principles which 
he believes characterise successful public sector change efforts and can help achieve desired efforts. These are: 
i) Improving performance against agency mission. 
ii) Win over diverse stakeholders.   
iii) Create a change roadmap.   
iv) Take a comprehensive approach.  
v) Be a leader not a bureaucrat.  
In summary, Ostroff (2006) observed that leaders of government agencies operate under encumbrances not 
common in the private sector. But he noted that the best of them have improved performance by “adopting and 
adapting” some goals and methods that have been proven in business. 
2.2.2 Rahim and Panicker’ Organisational Change in Government 
Rahim & Panicker (2007) admit that there are numerous models of organisational change but the essential 
framework for most of them follow the Lewinian model, conceding that the entire organisational change process 
revolves around this very simple model. They performed a literature review on organisational reform and 
government and added one important aspect which they felt was missing from the literature.  
2.2.2.1 Prerequisites for Successful Change 
Conner’s (1993) prerequisites for successful organisational change are ‘pain’ and ‘remedy’ (Rahim & Panicker 
2007, p.7). The later justifies breaking from the status quo while the former will solve the problem or take 
advantage of the opportunity afforded by the current situation.   
2.2.2.2 Addressing Resistance to Change 
Rahim and Panicker (2007) also reviewed the literature on managing resistance to change. Koch (2006) believes 
people refuse to change because ‘change hurts’ such that response to change is predictable and universal: humans 
simply avoid it. Harvey (1996) believes resistance to change does not exist hence using Lewin’s force field analysis 
to help managers overcome change resistance is a sheer waste of time (Rahim & Panicker, 2007, p.7). He also 
claims people don’t resist change but resist punishment. Therefore, instead of focusing on resistance to change as 
a concept, the change agent should set conditions which make change rewarding or punishing in an organisation. 
Rahim & Panicker (2007) claimed, to be most effective, change implementation must minimise surprises and 
incorporate systems for ‘clarifying and familiarising employees with the new ways of operating’ (p.8) supported 
by Peters (1994) and Adams (1988). 
2.2.2.3 Model for Organisational Change in Government 
Rahim and Panicker (2007) considered the existing models of organisational change, (including Ostroff’s model), 
and concluded that none could be applied directly to governments. They argued that the fundamental nature of 
political leadership coupled with lack of typical shareholder accountability made application of existing models 
weak. They developed a model for organisational change in government. First, they considered that most changes 
occur either due to a ‘push’ (internally driven need for change) or a ‘pull’ (external factors which force you to 
change) sometimes called ‘supply-led’ or ‘demand-driven’ change. They reckoned that government requires a 
major effort for both demand and supply led efforts to be successful. They therefore proposed a ‘Push & Pull’ 
model for government as opposed to the conventional ‘Push vs. Pull’. They also suggested that normal incremental 
models of change may not be sufficient to bring about the required changes in government due to the sheer 
magnitude of changes and the proliferation of thinking or culture which must be changed. ‘Reforming’ had to 
occur after changing the existing form. For government, they proposed to change Lewin’s model of 
“Unfreeze=>Movement=>Refreeze” to “Melt=>Reshape=>Refreeze” as reflected in Figure 5 below.  
 
              
 
 
To 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Government organisational change model 
The above figure reflects Panicker & Rahim’s (2007) proposal to change Lewin’s model of change for it to 
be applicable for government organisations. The implications of applying this model are that: 
i) Change needs must be even more pronounced; 
ii) Attempts must be made for radical rather than incremental change; and 
iii) An action research model may need to be applied bearing in mind the unique context of the respective 
government organisation. 
Unfreeze Movement Refreeze 
Melt Reshape Refreeze 
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The overall organisational development (OD) process will still consist of the usual stages of diagnosis, feedback, 
planning and implementation. Once change is adopted, the following steps are suggested for governmental OD:  
Systems approach: adopt a holistic approach to incorporate all potential change elements. 
Envisioning: create critical mass for change.   
Appoint change agents: preferably internal as opposed to external consultants.  
Address culture issues: most critical aspect involving change in work environment and shift in staff mindsets. 
Rahim and Panicker (2007) refer to ‘making dinosaurs dance’ (p.2) in their thesis for a reason. They reckon that 
21st century government is “a large behemoth, often pulled down by its own size and complexity” (p2). They thus 
analogise: like dinosaurs, government lives in an era of discontinuous change. But unlike, dinosaurs, government 
cannot afford the luxury of making itself extinct. It must and has to change. They concluded, “If you pull the right 
strings, the dinosaur can dance. Caveat. Use very strong strings” (p.20). This implies that, with the right tools, 
attitudes and conditions, change management in government can potentially yield positive and desired results.    
 
2.3 Change Management in Non-Profit Organisations 
Clearly, the models of organisational change proposed in literature are meant for ‘for-profit’ organisations making 
them unsuitable and can therefore cannot be directly transplanted to the non-profit sector. Rahim and Panicker 
(2007) came closest when they developed their model for change management in government complimented by 
some glimpses of Ostroff’s principles on change management in government. But this still falls far short for 
applicability in NPOs. Granted, NPOs share the same problem with government when it comes to shareholder 
accountability, readily observable and quantifiable outputs, and profit objectives or lack thereof. However, NPOs 
are much smaller in size and possess the flexibility to respond to changes in the environment far much more than 
government does. Some are even run on commercial lines and hence are a ‘half-way house’ between government 
and commercial enterprises.  
Anheier (2000) argued , “The management of non-profit organisations is often ill understood because we do 
not understand these organisations well, and it is frequently ill conceived because we operate from the wrong 
assumptions about how non-profit organisations function” (p.2). His thesis was that current management and 
organisational theories do not fully address the question as to whether NPOs are fundamentally different from both 
the ‘for-profit’ enterprise and the public agency to require separate management models and practices. This 
seemingly simple question inadvertently leads to other challenging ones like whether NPO management could be 
a variation of business management? Or does it approximate public management and administration? Or is the 
management of the non-profit enterprise dissimilar to both, requiring models that fit neither the corporation nor 
the public agency? Armed with the earlier NPO definition, it is justifiable to ask if the non-profit form is 
intrinsically associated with distinctive features that lead to characteristic behaviours and outcomes in terms of 
strategic change management. 
Many distinguished writers have made and supported such claims, for example: 
 The essence of NPOs is their dual functions as ‘value-guardians’ and ‘service-providers’ (Kramer 1981; 
Anheier, 2000).  
 The value orientation of NPOs is their essential feature (Hudson 1999; Paton 1996; Anheier, 2000) 
 Trust and voluntarism are at the centre of NPOs (Tonkiss & Passey 1999; Anheier, 2000). 
Anheier (2000) concludes that each of these proposals may be valid to a certain degree and may be applicable 
to some NPOs but certainly not all. He reckons that some NPOs mirror Kramer’s behaviors, but others just do not. 
True, some are ‘value-led’ or ‘value-based’ but others function following no known value system or ideology. 
Others don’t exhibit any notion of ‘voluntarism’ and may not have any volunteers at all. More so, some authors 
consider NPOs as “trivial and inconsequential” (Anheier, 2000, p.2; Perrow, 1986, pp. 172-173). Yet the trend 
over the years has been exactly the opposite. Some NPOs have emerged as dominant economic forces while others 
have become indispensable political actors (Salamon et al, 1999; Meyer et al, 1997; Lewis, 1999; Anheier, 2000). 
Over time, many NPOs have adopted the language, management practices and even the philosophy of business 
enterprises globally. The author can testify to this reality based on his experience spanning two decades in various 
managerial roles in international development organisations. Anheier (2000) asks why and how this happened but 
more worryingly the literature is clear that NPOs and non-profit management are still not so well understood. The 
pertinent question is why? 
 
2.4 Summary 
The models of change reviewed this section attempted to conceptualise strategic change, some in overly simplistic 
terms such as Grundy’s three types of change. Overall this section revealed that there is no one-size-fits-all model 
or framework for managing change but rather provides impetus for organisations to adopt a nuanced approach and 
to analyse situations when change is desirable and help map out the most suitable approach to bring about the 
desired change. It was noted that, in reality, change is much more complex, manifests itself differently in different 
organisations and occurs at different organisational levels and functions, and in different forms. All models 
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exhibited commonalities in two aspects. Firstly, change, whether internally or externally driven, is multi-
dimensional and comes in various forms, shapes and sizes. Secondly, leadership of organisational change is 
management’s most important role in the 21st century. Furthermore, the literature review has illustrated that 
existing models of organisational change are more suited to the commercial business enterprise and none can be 
directly transposed to non-profit entities. Rahim and Panicker’s (2007) model for organisational change for 
government was a spin-off from this clear deficiency. Our view is that their model cannot be applied to NPOs too 
because of the fundamental differences between these enterprises and public agencies. The literature highlights 
the importance of change and suggests ways to approach it but offers little empirical evidence to support the 
proposed theories and approaches. This paper attempts to cover this glaring knowledge gap in the literature. 
 
3. Method 
This section discusses the rationale for the research approach and methodology adopted to facilitate replicability 
and support the reliability and validity of the study’s findings.  
 
3.1 Research Methodology  
The primary objective of the research is to critically evaluate strategic change management in the non-profit sector 
and develop recommendations for future management of strategic change in NPOs. The specific objectives of the 
research are: 
i) To evaluate the generic literature on strategic change management and its application to NPOs. 
ii) To critically review how strategic change has been implemented using an inter-governmental and an 
international organisation primary case studies / points of reference.  
iii) Based on the research findings, provide recommendations for future change management in these and 
similar NPOs. 
From the literature review, the increasingly important role of NPOs since the 1970s and their continued 
mushrooming to date the world over was self-evident. Yet, as the author can testify from decades of experience in 
these organisations, they are characteristically slow in adopting change. When they do finally embrace the change, 
it is handled in a laissez faire manner. The gap which exists in how NPOs manage strategic change was identified 
and confirmed through the literature review. To address the research questions adequately, the study was supported 
by both primary and secondary data. Use was made of unstructured interviews as the main means of collecting 
primary data. This was supplemented by information from secondary sources such as the respective organisation’s 
annual reports, internet sources, unpublished and published literature. 
The research adopted an inductive stance since general conclusions and recommendations on future change 
management in non-profit organisations were drawn based on the researcher’s empirical observations taking a 
phenomenological approach (Ghauri et al, 1995). The research method or technique employed was primarily 
‘qualitative’ since the findings are not a result of applying ‘statistical methods or other procedures of quantification’ 
(Ghauri et al, 1995, p.85). The qualitative method suited the study most since the objective was to gain an in-depth 
insight into a specific phenomenon. Moreover, the outcome was based on studying human experiences and 
organisational behaviour on the subject of strategic change management (Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Ghauri et al, 
1995). Since the researcher’s aim was to gain insights as opposed to testing a hypothesis, in an area where there is 
limited theory available as guidance, the research strategy was descriptive and premised on comparative case 
studies (Ghauri et al, 1995). This method was chosen since ‘how’ and ‘what’ questions were addressed, the 
researcher did not have full control over events and focus was on a real life, current phenomenon (Yin 1989; 
Ghauri et al, 1995, p.88) in more than one organisation with the objective of comparative analysis and drawing 
some general conclusions. The methodology comprised the following: 
3.1.1 Literature Review 
This entailed a review of relevant published literature on strategic change management. 
3.1.2 Secondary Data Collection 
This involved literature search and review of existing historical material, records, correspondences, reports and 
websites. As an insider, the author had access to extensive organisational information that is normally not 
accessible to external researchers. Secondary data was used to supplement and ‘triangulate’ or ‘validate’ the 
primary data. (Arkley & Knight, 1991; Bloor, 1997; Halloway, 1997; Groenewald 2004). 
3.1.3 Primary Data Collection 
The field research involved unstructured face-to-face or ‘in-depth’ interviews coupled with direct observation and 
interaction with Executive Management of the two target organisations. The objective was to establish their views 
and perceptions on the management of strategic change in their respective organisations thereby facilitating an in-
depth exploration of change management practices and the impacts on their strategic direction. 
 
3.2 Research Tools Design and Distribution 
The author paid close attention to ethical research using the following documents: 
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3.2.1 Informed Consent Form 
The form was designed to obtain prior informed consent of the respective target organisations and participants. It 
provided research details and clarified the participants’ role, rights and obligations including confidentiality, 
anonymity and the right to withdraw from the research anytime. 
3.2.2 Standard Ethics Protocol 
The protocol further reinforced the participant’s role, rights and obligations. The protocol was read to the 
interviewee before each interview and a copy was deposited with the participant after the interview.  
3.2.3 Interview Questions 
With ‘unstructured’ interviews there is no pre-determined list of questions, but a clear idea and storyline is required 
about the issues and circumstances to be explored. The researcher used the following questions as the basis for 
exploring the pertinent research issues and in guiding the overall framework of the interview. 
 What were the key strategic changes which have occurred in the organisation since its formation? 
 How has change been managed in the past and how did it impact the organisation’s strategic direction?  
 How can the organisations ensure that change is managed in a more effective way in future? 
 
3.3 Interview Process 
Use was made of unstructured or in-depth interviews because of the nature of the research which is a qualitative 
inquiry and the data must capture people’s ‘language and behaviour’ through their ‘words and actions’ (Berry, 
1999). Qualitative interviews are one of the most important and commonly used data collection methods in 
qualitative research (Myers & Newman, 2007). It was the main data gathering method employed in this study. 
Data was collected through face-to-face interviews that were audio recorded with participants’ prior consent. The 
participants agreed to be audio-taped based on mutual trust of confidentiality and the interviews were held in a 
friendly environment since most of the participants already knew the researcher. The longstanding rapport 
countered interviewer suspicion and distrust normally directed to external researchers right from the start. The 
interviews were conducted over a three-week period and each lasted between one hour and one and half hours. 
Rough interview notes were taken during the interview and more detailed field notes drafted soon after the 
interviews. The interview data was transcribed by the researcher within a day after the interview for use in 
qualitative data analysis. A transcribed copy was sent to each participant for confirmation.  
 
3.4 Sample Selection and Justification  
The following two organisations were chosen for the comparative case study: 
3.4.1 Organisation 1: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
COMESA is a regional inter-governmental organization consisting of 19 Member States (MS) in Eastern and 
Southern Africa which was formed to “contribute to regional economic integration through trade facilitation and 
infrastructure development in various sectors” (www.comesa.org). COMESA was formed in 1981 as the 
Preferential Trade Area (PTA) for its member states and transformed into COMESA in 1994 through the signing 
of the COMESA Treaty. Its headquarters is based in Lusaka, Zambia. COMESA’s vision is “To be a fully 
integrated, internationally competitive and prosperous economic community with high standards of living for its 
people and ready to merge into the African Union” (COMESA Annual Report, 2009). 
3.4.2 Organisation 2: Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) 
MISA is a regional non-governmental organisation that was created in 1992 to promote a free, independent, 
pluralistic and sustainable media environment in Southern Africa. MISA’s Regional Secretariat is based in 
Windhoek, Namibia supported by National Chapters in 11 Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) 
countries. MISA's vision is for “A southern Africa region in which the media enjoys freedom of expression, 
independence from political, economic and commercial interests, pluralism of views and opinions.” 
(www.misa.org).   
3.4.3 Rationale for Sample Selection 
The two case studies were chosen since the author decided to carry out a comparative study using the inductive 
approach but seeking general explanations. These chosen cases were current and immediate past employers of the 
researcher respectively and were readily accessible to the researcher. The researcher also considered resource 
constraints such as time, funds and travel logistics for conducting the research. A comparative analysis will show 
what was done well in one organisation and may not have been done so well in the other organisation and vice 
versa. The researcher chose a total of ten participants, five from each organisation’s Executive Management 
comprising of directors in COMESA and regional managers in MISA. Boyd (2001) considers two to ten 
interviewees as ‘sufficient to reach saturation’ (Groenewald 2004, p.11), while Creswell (1998 pp. 65, 113) 
believes ‘long interviews with up to 10 people’ is ideal for a phenomenological study (Groenewald 2004, p.11).  
 
3.5 Data Analysis 
The following methods of data analysis were employed: 
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3.5.1 Field notes 
Although field notes are normally classified as a secondary data storage method, they are also a form of data 
analysis as according to Lofland and Lofland (1999) they are ‘part of the analysis rather than the data collection’, 
by virtue of the fact that they involve ongoing interpretation (Groenewald, 2004, p.15). 
3.5.2 Qualitative Data Analysis 
Data analysis was conducted right from the point of data collection since the interviewer had to interpret responses 
to interview questions as well as ask probing questions. Ghauri et al (1995) refer to this as simultaneous data 
collection and analysis. Final analysis and interpretation of the data was done using Hycner’s (1999) simplified 
‘explicitation process’ applying the following steps (Groenewald, 2004, p.17): 
i) Bracketing and phenomenological reduction. 
ii) Delineating units of meaning. 
iii) Clustering of units of meaning to form themes. 
iv) Summarizing and validating individual interview and modify as necessary. 
v) Extract general and unique themes from all interviews and form a composite summary.  
As the study pursued phenomenological attitude, the researcher drew meaning out of the individual cases hence 
no data categorisation or quantification was necessary. More so, coding was not required since the analysis was to 
provide ‘new integrative insights’ from understanding a specific phenomenon and the findings synthesized into a 
final written ‘logical, consistent and persuasive report’ (Ghauri et al, 1995). 
 
4. Findings 
4.1 Overview of Findings 
This section presents the findings of the primary research in the context of the literature review. The term 
‘explicitation’ has been preferred to ‘analysis’ which, according to Hycner (1999) is a misnomer in 
phenomenology as it implies ‘breaking into parts’ as opposed to ‘investigation of the constituents of a phenomenon 
while keeping the context of the whole’ (Groenewald, 2004, p.17). The research produced several important 
general findings on the management of strategic change in the studied organisations. The explicitation of the 
primary data obtained from the qualitative interviews resulted in clear themes for both organisations which fully 
address the research questions and can be linked directly to the specific objectives of the research. The findings 
were analysed and presented according to the themes as shown below: 
 The key strategic changes and how was change managed by NPOs 
 The impact on the organisations’ strategic direction 
 What may have worked well and not so well in the organisations  
Finally, the section winds down with a comparative analysis of change management in the NPOs studied to draw 
what worked well in one organisation that didn’t quite work well in the other and vice versa. 
 
4.2 Strategic Change Management in COMESA  
4.2.1 Key Strategic Changes in COMESA 
From the interviews, it emerged that between 1981 to 2010 COMESA went through several strategic changes and 
the key ones are presented in these findings.  
i) Transformation from the PTA to COMESA: A major change in COMESA was its transformation from the PTA 
which was formed in 1981 to COMESA in 1994 (see Figure 6 below).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Transformation of COMESA 
Source: Muravu (2011) 
The figure above reflects transformation of COMESA from PTA in 1981 to its long-term strategic goal of 
achieving Economic Community status by 2025.  
ii) Formation of the Free Trade Area (FTA): The FTA was formed in 2000 and involved elimination of tariffs on 
COMESA originating products by nine Member States with the expectation that the others would soon follow suit.  
iii) Launching of the Customs Union (CU): COMESA launched the CU as successor to the FTA in 2009. A CU is 
as a merger of two or more customs territories into a single customs territory, where MS engage in free trade 
among themselves and apply a common external tariff to third party imports.  
iv) Changes to the organisational structure and creation of COMESA regional institutions: COMESA adopted a 
comprehensive decision-making structure which evolved over the years from the one originally set by the PTA 
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Treaty to reflect the changes that the organisation experienced during its life cycle. The COMESA Secretariat (CS) 
which originally adopted its organisational structure from its PTA predecessor in 1994 underwent various 
restructuring exercises since then. Also, several regional institutions were created to promote sub-regional co-
operation and development. These include the COMESA Clearing House, the COMESA Trade and Development 
Bank, the COMESA Bankers Association, the COMESA Leather and Leather Products Institute, the COMESA 
Re-Insurance Company, the Africa Trade Insurance Agency and the Regional Investment Agency. 
v) Formation of the Tripartite Arrangement: In 2008 COMESA, the East African Community (EAC) and the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) adopted a Tripartite arrangement. This required each 
Regional Economic Community (REC) to promote economic and social development and growth through regional 
integration as building blocks to the African Economic Community (AEC) pursuant to the Final Act of Lagos 
signed by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Heads of State in 1980. 
4.2.2 Strategic Change Implementation in COMESA 
The interviews revealed a lot of insight on the approaches to implementing strategic change in COMESA, which 
are discussed under six key dimensions of organisational change espoused in literature (Beer & Norhia, 2000, 
p.16). These are: change goals, leadership, change focus, change process, reward system, and use of external 
consultants. 
4.2.2.1 Change Goals 
The change goals in COMESA have mainly been to meet the dictates of the PTA / COMESA treaties coupled with 
need to meet the demands of the operational environment or in response to external changes. This is summed up 
in what one of the interviewed directors had to say: 
COMESA as an organisation is essentially closed to the founding Treaty, which cannot be amended. The 
PTA Treaty’s life only ended with the signing of the COMESA Treaty in 1994. The milestones which are set 
up in the treaty become the main drivers of change, coupled with changes in the external environment. 
(Director 1, COMESA)    
Most of the COMESA strategic changes that were identified by the interviewees as detailed above were pre-
determined by the Treaties or were founded through signing of agreements or Charters while changes to the 
organisational structure was a response to the demands of the external environment. 
4.2.2.2 Change Leadership   
The study revealed that the decision-making process in COMESA, being a regional inter-governmental 
organisation, is quite complex. Predictably, the structure and operations of such a regional organisation will mirror 
that of the 19 governments of which it is a hybrid. Yet it is the decision-making process which determines the 
speed and effectiveness with which change can be implemented. One interviewee said: 
The whole process starts internally with the management team strictly guided by the treaty, previous Policy 
Organs decisions and the general goings-on. Once a need for change is identified by management, it goes 
through the rank and file of the various Policy Organs up to Authority level. Once the decision is made it 
reverts to management for implementation. For me this is not top-bottom or bottom-up approach but mixed. 
However, I should hasten to say that during implementation literally everyone is involved. (Director 2, 
COMESA) 
4.2.2.3 Change Focus 
The study indicated that COMESA has traditionally focused on streamlining the structures and systems 
(organizational “hardware”) per the archetype (theory) E of change (Beer & Norhia, 2000) as a way of managing 
change. For example, in 1997, the CS revised its structure to address the changing environment, operations and 
activities through introduction of a programmatic approach. In 2004, COMESA further commissioned a mid-term 
review of the organisational structure in order to assess its appropriateness considering its planned programmes, 
vision and priorities for the future. The then new Secretary General adopted a new approach altogether reflected 
in his ‘not-business-as-usual’ statement below: 
The previous approaches left COMESA entangled in a ‘policy and procedure trap’ at the expense of results. 
But my interest is on delivery and results and this starts at the top. When you look at my mission reports there 
are concrete results there. Yet I have seen minutes and reports which unfortunately are long on issues and 
short on results. For 2011, technical personnel will have to ensure that things happen on the ground. I will 
not allow missions and meetings that are not results-oriented. This may sound harsh, but the lesson I have 
learnt over the last couple of years is that when you have Managers who do not share the vision of the leader, 
it is difficult to get results. (Secretary General, COMESA) 
4.2.2.4 Change Process 
From the study it emerged that change is well planned and adapted from the overall framework, the Treaty.  
COMESA always has a clear, comprehensive, and shared action plan and this helps in terms of achieving 
internal coordination and it also tends to foster confidence among both internal and external shareholders. 
The plan is, to the leadership, … a compass … not only providing the overall strategic direction but telling 
quickly when we are getting off-course. (Director 3, COMESA) 
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Once change decisions are approved by the Authority, they revert to management who then decide the best way 
to execute them or to implement the change. Depending on the size, nature, complexity of the change and 
(non)availability of in-house capacity, some change was approached through formation of in-house task forces 
comprising members from various departments or was thrown back to the departmental or unit head to manage. 
Action plans have ensured clearly defined roles and responsibilities while setting up of change programme task 
forces ensured the “best brains” are working on the organisational transformation. 
4.2.2.5 Reward System / Culture Change 
The study also looked at the issue of the reward system as it applies to change management in COMESA as 
reflected in one interviewee’s sentiments below.  
As it happened, COMESA’s reward system has been both in financial terms in the form of improved 
remuneration for professionals as well as reinforcing culture change. This may sound contradictory but it’s 
not. Remember that we are competing for regional human resources with other RECs, such as SADC and 
EAC. Financial rewards addressed the short-term need for market competitiveness while culture change 
provides us with capabilities for future success. (Director 3, COMESA). 
COMESA ensures fair and competitive remuneration for its staff by conducting salary surveys every two years 
and adjusting its remuneration regime accordingly. Culture change management emerged as a major issue given 
that COMESA employs over 200 professional staff, sourced from its highly competitive labour catchment area of 
19 MS, within its 12 divisions and units. These different nationalities bring together their diverse cultures, history 
and values to one place. To tap into this cultural diversity, the CS holds regular staff retreats and Total Quality 
Management (TQM) sessions to encourage information and experiential sharing among staff. 
4.2.2.6 Use of External Consultants 
From the study, it was clear that COMESA utilises its in-house resources to the highest extents possible as 
recommended in literature. This is reflected by the fact that COMESA has a highly competent professional work 
force over 50% of which are holders of advanced degrees and / or professional qualifications. However, COMESA 
engages external consultants to carry out specific assignments such as in-country technical / feasibility studies. 
4.2.3 Impact of COMESA’s Change Management Approaches on its Strategic Direction 
We address whether the change approaches adopted by COMESA met desired change programs’ objectives.  
4.2.3.1. Positive Impacts: 
A prominent finding was that, overall, COMESA’s change management approaches positively impacted on the 
strategic direction of the organisation. The following examples support this view:  
i) COMESA’s specialised regional institutions, played a key role in their respective areas of competitive advantage 
and had positive impact on its regional integration and economic development agenda.  
ii) Since inception, the CS was structured to be lean and efficient and this aspect has always been reflected in all 
subsequent changes to its organisational structure. The effect of change on the CS’s structure has been achievement 
of efficiency and cost effectiveness. The divisional structure that was introduced in 1997, for example, resulted in 
a CS that was aligned to meet the region’s changed needs and requirements.   
iii) The establishment of the FTA changed the interplay of economic relations between COMESA MS forever. 
The study revealed that the FTA was growing at over 20% per annum and intra-COMESA trade increased from 
US$3.1 billion to US$14.3 billion from 2000 to 2008 respectively. The achievement of the CU is another proof 
that COMESA’s approaches to managing strategic change have positively impacted on the regional governments’ 
attempt to improve the welfare of their citizens. 
iv) The Tripartite arrangement has been a very significant step towards the overall goal of the African Union to 
deepen the economic integration of the African continent. The proposed road map, draft legal and institutional 
instruments for establishing the Tripartite FTA have been developed the by the TTF with a proposed Tripartite 
FTA establishment date of 1 January 2012. The other impact of change management on the Tripartite is that the 
three RECs have already started to implement joint programmes in various sectors and initiatives. For example, 
the launch of Africa’s first One-Stop Border Post between Zambia and Zimbabwe in Chirundu in 2009 has totally 
changed the way in which the three RECs operated in the past. (COMESA Annual Report, 2009)  
v) The holding of annual retreats helped to develop common values that have led to the formation of a distinctive 
COMESA corporate culture. TQM sessions helped to build rapport and team spirit, and to generally exchange 
information amongst staff.  
As a recognition of excellence in change management at regional level, the COMESA Secretary-General, was in 
October 2010 awarded the Drivers of Change Award in the Government Category by the Southern Africa Trust 
for his instrumental role in establishing the Tripartite. “Through his leadership, a future that looks promising is 
being crafted for Africa”, noted the award’s judges. The award recognises individuals or organisations from 
Southern Africa that are making real impact, “especially in developing effective public policies and strategies, to 
overcome poverty.” (COMESA News, 2010, p3) 
4.2.3.2. Negative Impacts: 
The only albatross on COMESA’s good record on achievement of positive change management results is the 
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characteristic slow pace of change. One interviewee lamented: 
Change in COMESA is painfully slow. This causes delays in achievement of the organisation’s overall 
mandate. If you thought a year later is late, wait until you hear that a change decision that’s made in COMESA 
today can be implemented after five, even ten years. (Director 2, COMESA) 
From the study, it is apparent that COMESA has largely met its change management objectives through the 
adopted approaches to implementing change. 
 
4.3 Strategic Change Management in MISA 
4.3.1 Key Strategic Changes in MISA 
The study established the following major strategic changes have occurred in MISA since its inception. 
i) Transformation to a regional office: MISA transformed from a modest one-person office in 1992 to a fully-
fledged regional office employing more than 30 staff, including the author, by 2010. By 1994, MISA employed 
three staff and in 1996, it transformed itself from a regional network of activists into a membership-based 
organisation. MISA developed rapidly from 1997 following the creation of a Chapter Development Fund (CDF) 
to finance its growth within the entire SADC region.  
ii) Expansion of MISA’s mandate: MISA’s original mandate of championing press freedom was expanded to 
include broadcasting as a direct response to the founding of the African Charter on Broadcasting in 2002, which 
provided principles for the broadcast media. This led to the broadening of MISA’s mandate to encompass freedom 
of the electronic media as opposed to print media only. 
iii) Transition from “core funding” to “strategic financing”: From inception, MISA was funded by several 
external donors on a core funding basis. In 2002, MISA entered into a “basket funding” agreement in which its 
main donors agreed to support MISA’s 3-year “Strategic Partnership Programme” (SPP). A second SPP (SPP2) 
was signed with the same donors for the 5-year period from 2006-10 and extended to a 3rd SPP (SPP3) for 3 years 
to 2013.  
iv) Adjustment to MISA’s governance structure: The study revealed that, a major problem for the organisation was 
that there was no clarity on the decision-making process. The governance structure needed to be adjusted for 
MISA’s ownership, control, roles and lines of command to be clarified.   
v) Formation of new sister organisations: During its first decade, MISA created 3 new sister organisations to off-
load some of its non-core, yet complimentary, activities in discharging its overall mandate. The MISA autonomous 
subsidiaries included the Southern Africa Media Development Fund, the Southern Africa Media Entrepreneurial 
Development Fund and the Nordic SADC Journalism Centre. 
vi) MISA major restructuring exercise: In 2003 MISA’s RS carried out a major staff restructuring exercise which 
was meant to professionalize the organisation by ensuring that it was properly staffed to deliver on the new SPP 
strategic plan.  
4.3.2 Strategic Change Implementation in COMESA 
Just as in the case of COMESA, the interviews of executive management were an eye opener on MISA’s 
approaches to strategic change implementation. For comparative purposes, the author pursued the same 
dimensions which were examined in the COMESA case study.  
4.3.2.1 Change Goals 
The study established that change in MISA was determined by the strategic priorities identified through the 
strategic planning process which made extensive use of external consultants.  
Change for MISA has been internally driven using the organisation’s strategic planning process as well as 
externally driven through demands of donors. Some changes have been undertaken to provide a constant fit 
to the changing demands of the operational environment. (Regional Manager 1, MISA) 
For example, the SPP originated from two processes i) MISA’s own strategic planning process which commenced 
in 1999, designed to transform MISA from a core-funded to a project-activity-funded organisation and ii) the 
participatory evaluation / review undertaken by consultants in 2001 on behalf of donors. The development of 
country chapters was in line with the 1991 Windhoek Declaration, one of the organisation’s formative triggers, 
while diversification into broadcasting and restructuring were in response to changes in the external environment. 
4.3.2.2 Change Leadership  
Leadership in MISA is two-pronged in that change direction is set from the top while encouraging participation at 
all levels as reflected by one interviewee. 
Change leadership in MISA is essentially combined. The leader gets everyone involved but keeping the 
overall direction. This excludes the bizarre case in 2003 when a restructuring process driven by the Regional 
Governing Council affected everyone including the Regional Director and his deputy with the result that both 
lost their jobs. As I have said, this is the odd exception in MISA, not the rule. (Regional Manager 2, MISA) 
4.3.2.3 Change Focus 
It emerged that MISA as an organization concentrated on ‘structure and systems’ to the detriment of corporate 
culture. MISA and its donors commissioned a joint evaluation and review in 2002. It began implementing the 
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recommendations from 2003 which included an SPP and staff restructuring. An OD process commenced in 2006 
to correct the emergent complex governance structure which had begun to impede the organisation’s natural 
progression as reflected in one interview’s response below:  
MISA’s change focus has been on organisational restructuring…. For example, a major problem was that the 
decision-making processes were not clear. The constitution contradicted the Deed of Trust on MISA’s 
ownership. This legal contradiction, emanating from MISA’s registration as both a membership organisation 
and a trust needed to be urgently addressed. (Regional Director, MISA) 
Furthermore, as MISA evolved from infancy to maturity, there was a need for the organisation to have a clearer 
distinction between governance and management structures / issues. The Board's responsibilities were shifted to 
governance, leaving management issues to the Regional Director.  
4.3.2.4 Change Process 
The study revealed that change management process in MISA followed a comprehensive ‘checklist’ which was 
prepared after each strategic plan, evaluation or review.  
Following each sanctioned review, both the donors and the RGC mandated management to implement the 
recommendations. More accurately, the recommendations came with a proposed action plan indicating the 
importance and urgency of actioning each recommendation. Management were therefore given a fait 
accompli...they were just mandated to operationalize the change and report progress to the next donors’ or 
governors’ meeting. (Regional Manager 2, MISA) 
This view was corroborated by one OD process Term of Reference (ToR) which specifically required the 
consultant to prepare a ‘detailed implementation plan’ with the involvement of Regional Secretariat (RS). Where 
necessary, there was clear role-sharing between MISA and external consultants. But how did a consultant-based 
prescriptive approach ensure management ownership of the change process by the executors? This was addressed 
from two fronts: 
First, MISA and the donors agreed on a participatory approach to evaluation at ToRs stage. This approach 
followed a process which involved all identified stakeholders to articulate and present their needs, interests 
and expectations. Second, the leadership of the change process rests with RS management and the RGC who 
articulate and approve the action plan to achieve the desired changes. (Regional Director, MISA) 
The 2003 staff restructuring exercise involved re-advertising all RS staff positions in response to implementation 
of the new strategic plan and the 2001 review which had questioned the RS’s ability to be a pro-active service 
organ for the National Chapters in its then existing state. 
4.3.2.5 Reward System 
MISA’s reward system was principally based on financial incentives. The SPP1 review, for example, made 
“harmonization of remuneration standards in MISA” a key recommendation. This was achieved through a job 
evaluation exercise which was outsourced to an external HR consultancy firm which also developed job 
descriptions and implemented a job grading system. Unfortunately, MISA’s culture of change had not supported 
investment in the culture change itself resulting in the ‘bizarre case’ referred to earlier when:  
The RGC became ‘overzealous’ and in attempting to professionalize the organisation decided to advertise all 
senior positions including that of the Regional Director and his deputy. Earlier, I said this was ‘bizarre’ 
because the senior management who were supposed to lead the change found themselves in a weird position 
where they had to compete with some of their ambitious juniors for their jobs! Regional Manager 2 (MISA) 
4.3.2.6 Use of External Consultants 
MISA also made extensive use of consultants as agents of change. The numerous evaluations and reviews that 
were demanded by MISA’s donors were conducted by various consultants. One interviewee said: 
Apart from the physical surveys and assessments of the regional office and its chapters, the consultants were 
required to arrange regional workshops, conduct interviews and were responsible for designing and 
implementing up to reporting. (Regional Manager 1, MISA)  
This manager’s view was supported by the ToRs for one review / evaluation which expressly stated that “the 
assessment and recommendations of the technical review should strive to operationalize the lessons learnt 
identified during the evaluation process (i.e. how can MISA and the donors use the lessons learnt).” 
4.3.3 Impact of Change Management Approaches on MISA’s Strategic Direction 
Just like in the case of COMESA, it is important to establish if MISA’s change management approaches met the 
desired objectives by assessing their impact on the organisation’s strategic direction.  
4.3.3.1. Positive Impacts 
Clearly MISA experienced challenges in managing change since inception, but its change management approaches 
has mainly positive impact on the organisation’s strategic direction. To quote one consultant, MISA “is presently 
met with the challenge of managing success - not failure!” (Chigudu & Associates & Danicom, 2003).  
i) The OD review resulted in a streamlined corporate governance structure which could meet the strategic priorities 
of MISA and respond quickly to MISA’s changing needs and environment.  
ii) MISA also rightly offloaded some of its responsibilities to sister organisations and remained with a programme-
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focused structure. Each of the three new organisations ‘specialised’ in its area of competitive advantage, but 
nonetheless they could collaborate where each organisation’s key competencies were required. This brought a new 
era, for example, in terms of ready availability of media finance, training, research and development than hitherto 
experienced when MISA was still a single organisation. 
iii) Change management in MISA saw the establishment of a SADC-region wide organisation within a decade 
from scratch. The setting up of the CDF in 1997, provided financial support that led to the creation of a fully-
fledged RS supported by 11 National Chapters and employing 75 staff within the region by 2010. As seen from 
the interviews, MISA employed the strategic planning process coupled with external donor demands as a key 
driver of change management. This enabled MISA to broadly meet its overall objectives.  
iv) In 2002, the strategic planning process resulted in the SPP basket funding arrangement which guaranteed 
MISA’s long-term funding arrangements and provided a new sense of security, stability and enhanced capacity to 
work within a longer-term perspective for the entire MISA organisation. The SPP also introduced five operational 
programmes and one administrative programme which would become the backbone of MISA’s operations for at 
least a decade. It also resulted in considerably lighter administrative burdens due to simplified and harmonised 
reporting to donors.  
4.3.3.2 Negative Impacts 
As the study revealed, an organisation that started from humble beginnings to become a regional institution in 
record short time was fraught to be subjected to numerous structural challenges. Some deficient structural and 
organisational practices, which emerged over the first decade, began to have a negative influence on MISA’s 
ability to act under optimum conditions such as being able to implement all the activities planned under the SSPs. 
This triggered the numerous change management initiatives whose positive impacts were discussed above. The 
following were MISA’s approaches to implementing change which seem not to have born the desired results.  
i) ‘Bizarre’ handling of the restructuring exercise: The way the staff restructuring was handled left a lot to be 
desired. There was speculation, fear, anger, suspicion and lobbying prior to finalization of the process due to 
uncertainty about the future of staff members. When some senior staff were made redundant, this increased tension 
even further. The negative impact of the exercise reverberated throughout the organisation long after it was 
completed, to the extent that most interviewees seriously doubted if this particular exercise yielded the desired 
benefits. 
ii) Deficient organisational culture: From an organisational culture point of view, the deficient manner in which 
the same staff reshuffling exercise was handled created more internal friction that it resolved. This was further 
exacerbated by the poor communication system in the organisation which resulted in bad information, experiential 
sharing and learning which left MISA struggling to fulfil its function.  
Notwithstanding these deficiencies, the evaluations revealed that MISA’s change management approach enabled 
it to meet its overall change objectives.  
 
4.4 Comparative Analysis of Strategic Change Management in NPOs 
In order to justify the comparative case study approach adopted for the research this section analytically compares 
strategic change management in the two-case study organisations based on the study’s findings. 
i) Bureaucracy vs. flexibility: As an inter-governmental organisation, COMESA mirrors some characteristics 
and practices of a quasi-governmental organisation. Our view is that it is problematic enough to be a government 
agency, but it is worse when the bureaucratic inefficiencies of 19 governments are replicated in one organisation. 
MISA on the other hand is more structured around the lines of a non-government organisation and has much more 
flexibility to adopt private sector practices. Table 1 below reflects the similarities and differences in change 
management practices based on the studied six key dimensions of organisational change per Beer and Norhia 
(2000).  
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Table 1: Comparative analysis of change management practices in COMESA and MISA 
Dimension COMESA MISA 
Change 
goals 
Externally driven by Members 
States and to address the demands of 
the external operational environment 
Determined by strategic priorities identified through the 
strategic planning process, externally driven through 
demands of donors and also in response to changes in 
the external environment. 
Leadership Management team strictly guided by 
the treaty, previous Policy Organs 
decisions and existing operational 
circumstances 
Two-pronged as change direction is set from the top 
while encouraging participation at all levels 
Change 
focus 
Streamlining structures and systems 
or organisational “hardware” 
Concentrated on structure and systems to the detriment 
of corporate culture. Also, separation of corporate 
governance and management. 
Change 
process 
Well planned and adapted from the 
Treaty with action plans reflecting 
clearly defined roles and 
responsibilities 
Followed a comprehensive ‘checklist’ or ‘detailed 
implementation plan’ which was prepared after each 
strategic plan, evaluation or review.  
Reward 
system 
Use of both reward system and 
culture change 
Principally based on financial incentives and 
“harmonization of remuneration standards”. 
Unfortunately, did not supported investment in culture 
change 
Use of 
external 
consultants 
Change implementation is mainly 
through “inhouse” capacity with 
occasional use of external 
consultants based on complexity of 
change initiative 
Change implementation made extensive use of 
consultants for the numerous evaluations and reviews 
and the consultants were responsible for designing, 
implementing and reporting change initiatives to 
donors.  
Table 1 shows comparative analysis of change management practices in COMESA and MISA based on the studied 
six key dimensions of organisational change. (Source: Muravu, 2020) 
ii) Key change drivers: COMESA’s change is driven by its highest decision-making organ, the Authority, while 
MISA’s change is driven by the internal strategic planning process coupled with demands of its external funders.  
iii) Strategic Planning: Both organisations make extensive use of the strategic planning process as a vehicle of 
change. COMESA has a longer strategic planning horizon as reflected by its 25-year strategy supported by 3 to 5-
year mid-term strategic plans. This reflects the long-term nature of government planning. MISA’s strategic plans 
ranged between 3 to 5 years. 
iv) Agents of change: Both make use of external consultants as agents of change although MISA relies heavily on 
them while COMESA balances them with in-house resources. 
v) Pace of change: COMESA’s change process is frustratingly slow due to the bureaucratic processes’ 
governments must undergo before implementing change. This has resulted in long delayed, partially implemented 
or change initiatives that are never implemented. On the other hand, MISA’s change process has been 
comparatively fast since it was responding to a fast growing organisation which would have been seriously 
hampered by any delays in implementing the requisite changes.  
vi) Delegation of non-core activities: Both organisations delegated non-core, but complimentary, activities to 
autonomous institutions which specialize in specific areas of core competence and operate from different countries 
to the regional offices reflecting the regionality of the parent organisations and semi-autonomous nature of the 
subsidiary institutions. 
 
4.5 Summary 
The paper exposed the key strategic changes in the case study organisations, the attendant change management 
practices and offered an assessment of whether the approaches to implementing change met the desired objectives 
including their impact on the strategic direction of the organisations. An interesting, but hardly surprising trend 
which emerged from the study was that technical or operational managers tended to concentrate on detail for 
operational changes while support or service directors concentrated on administrative changes although both sets 
mentioned the other changes in passing.  
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
5.1 Conclusion 
The following synthesises the study’s findings with the original aim and objectives leading to development of 
recommendations for the management of strategic change in international non-profit organisations. The specific 
objective was, subject to evaluation of strategic change management literature and primary research, to critically 
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review how change has been implemented in an inter-governmental and an international organisation. The research 
first sought to establish how strategic change was managed in the past and what has been the impact on the 
organisations’ strategic directions. Secondly, we needed to assess what worked well in one organisation but might 
not have quite worked well in the other and vice versa. Finally, we interrogated how NPOs can ensure that change 
is managed most effectively in future. The following are conclusions and recommendations on strategic change 
management in COMESA and MISA. 
5.1.1 Conclusion on Change Management in COMESA   
COMESA has responded to the need for change remarkably well, for an inter-governmental organisation of its 
size, and has made several notable achievements to date. Through its various change management initiatives, 
COMESA has achieved sustainable economic and social progress in its MS through increased co-operation and 
integration in all fields of development. The CS has played a crucial role to ensure that COMESA attains its overall 
objectives. As noted from the study, most COMESA operations are premised on treaties, charters and agreements 
that were signed by Heads of State. This implies that decisions on change implementation are made based on 
unanimity of the MS. Yet failure by some MS to join the FTA for over a decade suggests that such unanimity 
doesn’t in fact exist or alternatively could it be that the largest trading bloc in Africa is still grappling with 
challenges and failing to persuade some of its MS to move to the next level of integration? Delays in 
implementation of change decisions cannot be tolerated in the 21st century’s fast changing operational environment 
because potential opportunities that are identified will invariably be lost. There were positive signs that this could 
change. The COMESA SG, addressing the 28th Meeting of the COMESA Council of Ministers said, “The 
important message and lesson from these developments is that the region must of necessity, through regional 
integration, move at the speed of a Cheetah…” (COMESA Post Summit Publication, 2010, p.12). 
This was echoed by the incoming Chairman of the Authority, who openly admitted that COMESA had not done 
well in speedy implementation of its decisions. Addressing the 14th Summit of COMESA and quote: 
It is encouraging to know that we have taken several serious decisions at this Summit to advance the cause 
of our organization. As the Chairman of the COMESA Authority, I will ensure that all Summit decisions are 
implemented without any delays. (COMESA Post Summit Publication, 2010 p.7) 
This realization of the need for speedy implementation of change decisions by these eminent and most influential 
leaders of COMESA is refreshing and may signify the beginning of a new era for strategic change management in 
the organisation. 
5.1.2 Conclusion on Change Management in MISA   
The study concluded that MISA’s internal housekeeping has been defective, its strategic planning process 
somewhat discordant and its donor relations management unfocused. These aspects were draining MISA of 
financial and human resources, which could be used more productively towards MISA's involvement in 
championing media freedom in SADC. More specifically, although MISA and its development partners had 
effectively collaborated in the past, the unpredictability of donor funding had reduced the effectiveness of MISA’s 
programmes. This led to a mutual inclination by MISA and its partners to explore a more harmonized approach to 
funding. 
Overall, it can be concluded that MISA through its strategic change management has established itself as one 
of the main champions of democracy and human rights, and no other organisations in the region - or on the African 
continent for that matter - has a better network in the media sector. Its SSP facilitated a more strategic approach to 
the serious issues of freedom of speech and public access to information and became the foundation for the 
longstanding ‘basket’ funding agreement with donors. The funding agreement was revolutionary and a very 
important arrangement for MISA which eliminated funding uncertainty and significantly reduced resources, which 
had previously been devoted to piece meal fundraising and the demands of multiple donor reporting.   
MISA’s short-term blooming success exposed it to greater complexity, increased risks and more choices 
about the future. This demanded to be handled carefully, consciously and consistently as failure to manage this 
growth well could very easily have resulted in inertia. To its credit, MISA overcame problems of infancy and 
matured to earn a strong reputation as the most central and credible organisation on issues of freedom of speech 
and access to information in Southern Africa.  
5.1.3 General conclusion on Change Management in NPOs 
The study revealed that NPOs do not follow any specific change management model as espoused in the literature. 
However, it identified key strategic changes that have taken place in the case study organisations and the various 
approaches to implementing these changes. The major changes were to align the organisations with the vagaries 
of their operational environment in accordance with literature whilst some were driven from within (i.e. 
organisations’ governance structures). MISA’s strategic change can be said to have been both ‘incremental’ and 
‘big bang’ (Balogun & Hope Hailey, 2004). The former regarding its implementation of strategic planning-driven 
change while the later relates, for example, to restructuring which saw senior staff including the CEO regrettably 
leave the organisation.  
On the other hand, COMESA’s change can be characterised as having mainly been ‘incremental’ followed 
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by ‘discontinuous’ change reflecting the organisation’s longer term planning horizon (Tushman et al,1988). There 
is no indication of specific or deliberate consideration of ‘contextual features’ nor ‘design choices’ (Balogun & 
Hope Hailey, 2004) in change management in both NPOs although some of these can be retroactively apply to 
certain change aspects. Greiner’s Organisational Life Cycle (1972) can be applied to MISA’s change management. 
The study established that most of the problems that MISA experienced around 1999-2000 were merely symptoms 
of an organisation which had outgrown itself. This resulted in a very complicated governance structure and an 
administrative load which threatened to strangle the entire organisation. MISA rightly diagnose this growth stage 
and employed solutions which moved it to the next stage by introducing the SSP and a more sustainable funding 
arrangement. MISA’s approach to implementing change thus became primarily strategic-planning driven.  
We can partially apply the Lewinian ‘driving and restraining forces of change’ (Schein 1996, p.71; Rahim & 
Panicker 2000, p.3) since both organisations had to deal with resistance to change. Overall, the implication is that 
there is huge potential and opportunity for NPOs to ‘borrow and calibrate’ some strategic change management 
practices which have been proven in the private sector and resulted in improved performance and attainment of 
desired results in some NPOs as attested to by this study. To buttress this up, the author has over 20 years’ 
managerial experience in the NPO sector and this study has validated his observation that the sector 
characteristically lags behind the private sector in introducing change. When change eventually arrives, it is 
handled in a laissez faire manner. Overall, this paper contributes positively to the theory of strategic change 
management in modern international organisations. 
 
5.2 Recommendations 
The following are the recommendations, emerging from the study, on how the case study NPOs can ensure that 
change is managed in the most effective way in future and by extension similar organisations.    
5.2.1 COMESA Recommendations 
To ensure that change is managed more effectively in future, COMESA must do the following: 
Firstly, to achieve optimal efficiency and effectiveness, the existing structure must be supported by best practice 
systems and procedures, competent staff and an enabling environment that empowers staff in decision making, 
encourages teamwork and increase motivation. Our view is that the proposed recommendations, if adopted and 
implemented, can serve to strengthen the operations of the CS in line with its regional, and quintessentially, 
international development role. Secondly, COMESA should ensure effective change management by developing 
a strategy for accelerated change implementation so that it takes advantage of opportunities that present themselves 
in the operational environment periodically. Thirdly, given the launch of the Tripartite Vision and Strategy 2010-
2015 and COMESA’s role as the lead and more influential REC in the Tripartite Arrangement, it is incumbent 
upon COMESA to exploit this reality in its change management strategy to support the programme for the eventual 
integration of the region. Consequently, all future programmes must endeavor to support, not only COMESA’s 
but, the Tripartite’s vision as well. Finally, COMESA’s change implementation would be more effective if it was 
supported by an information technology strategy as an enabling tool for change. For example, COMESA would 
need to automate routine and important operational processes such as the travel and expenses process. It is 
inconceivable that by 2010, COMESA given its regional status and position still does not have an Enterprise 
Resource Planning system and its processes are primarily manual to semi-manual. 
5.2.2 MISA Recommendations 
Similarly, MISA must consider the following in order to ensure effective implementation of change in future: 
Firstly, the organisation is at its peak, well established, influential in its area and adorable to international donors. 
But that leaves no time for complacency as it is exposed to the risk of plunging down. MISA must consolidate its 
past successes, in the upcoming years which will prove to be crucial for the organisation. The current status and 
present advantageous position must be exploited to achieve better performance. Secondly, the lack of clarity about 
ownership and control of MISA between the various bodies (RGC, Trust Funds Board or Membership?) has led 
to unclear governance and operational relations in the past. It is recommended that MISA resolves the governance 
problems urgently and decisively whilst the organisation is still doing well instead of waiting until these structural 
inadequacies start to cripple the organisation. This will ensure that change implementation is done more smoothly 
with clearer roles and responsibilities.  
Thirdly, MISA had been too dependent on donor funding for the 18 years of its existence (to 2010) to the 
extent that one consultant argued that the changes which occurred in MISA favored donors and not MISA itself. 
Further, it lent it to being easily brushed aside by regional governments as an instrument of western political and 
economic imperialism. That aside, and given world economic downturns like the 2008-9 one, potential donor 
fatigue and shifting donor priorities, it is strongly recommended for MISA to explore alternative and more 
sustainable revenue streams without going fully commercial and jeopardizing its role and mandate in media 
development. One way of doing that would be for MISA, as predominantly a knowledge institution, to curate and 
market the knowledge it generates through research and other means thereby generating revenue from this. That 
way it can become a self-sufficient and truly autonomous institution, which it strives to be, without being subjected 50 
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to external whims by funders as reveled by the study. This was something which the author had first-hand 
experience of when employed as Finance Director of the organisation in 2009-2010. Finally, although the SPP 
process helped MISA focus, there is still room for improvement. Granted, the National Chapters are of great 
strategic importance to MISA, but the RS must provide the strategic political overview and the technical capacity 
which they so lack.   
 
5.3 Limitations of the Research 
Every research study has its limitations regardless of the research methodology chosen. The author would like to 
highlight the following key limitations which must be considered within the context of the study’s findings. 
Firstly, as a comparative study, the research was conducted only on two organisations which are patently different. 
The findings are situation specific and therefore will labour to be generalised beyond the specific settings. As the 
study showed, the two organisations have significant differences as they have striking similarities. Resources 
permitting, a wider number of cases studied would have brought more insight into how change is managed in 
NPOs. Moreover, Henry (1990), repeated in the Economist (1997), warns against drawing definitive conclusions 
and recommendations from a population of less than 50 units. Secondly, the research failed to include British 
Council which had been identified as an example of best practice in NPO strategic change management from the 
author’s knowledge and experience as a previous staff of the organisation due to last minute senior management 
changes. This militated against the overall richness of the data collected. These limitations were considered in the 
presentation and analysis of the study’s findings. 
 
5.4 Directions for Future Research 
The purpose of this study was to explore strategic change management in the non-profit sector. Despite a plethora 
of literature on the general subject of change management, the author had difficulty identifying literature on change 
management in the non-profit sector. Even the literature review revealed that there has not been adequate research 
in this subject area. The author would like to recommend further mega research in the area of change management 
in the NPOs including possible model development. This may involve grouping these NPOs into ‘ownership’ and 
control, size and possibly purpose of existence to incorporate contextual factors. Apart from giving a richer insight 
into how NPOs are managed, this would also provide an overall view of how these organisations, which have 
become darlings of donors, exercise their stewardship role in discharging their mandates. As this study was 
conducted nearly a decade ago, another (longitudinal) study would help establish how the two organisations have 
commandeered the strategic change management journey since the last study.   
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